In their work The German Ideology, the founders of Marxism assert that the prerequisite of post-capitalist (defined by them as communist) society is the universal development of human abilities and all social relations. But then on the same page, contrary to this statement, it is alleged that the abolition of private property is not only highly topical but it is also an imperative history-making task. In Manifesto of the Communist Party, Marx and Engels explain that economic crises recurrently shaking capitalist (...) society expose an apparent contradiction between the productive forces and the capitalist relations of production – therefore, these relations must be eliminated for the preservation of society. Nonetheless, the same treatise affirms that the bourgeoisie cannot exist without revolutionizing not only the productive forces but also the relations of production. But in this case it stands to reason to recognize that there is no conflict between productive forces and production relations, and, therefore, there is no crisis of the capitalist system, either. Paradoxes in the communist theory of Marxism stem not merely from erroneous conceptions but reveal the fact that Marxism as an ideology comes into conflict with its scientific social theory. Hence, these paradoxes disclose the relative independence of the social theory of Marxism from its ideological postulates. (shrink)

Theodor Oizerman’s article “On The Meaning of the Question‘What is Philosophy?’” was first published in the journal “Voprosy filosofii”, 1968, vol. 11. Since that the issue has become a bibliographical rarity and still does not exist in a digital form. Other versions of the article were rewritten in the form of book chapters and transformed in the context of the current situation. This proposed publication bases on one of the older versions, which, is, on the one hand, close (...) to the original author’s intention, and on the other hand, lacks a certain dependence on the ideological context. The text, however, includes some critically important arguments appearing only in later editions. In general, the article is of central significance in terms of its place in the Metaphilosophy concept proposed by Oizerman, which later the following books have manifested: “The Problem Of The History Of Philosophy”(1969, 1983), “The Foundations For The Theory Of The Historico-Philosophical Process” (1983, in co-authorship with A.S. Bogomolov), “Philosophy As A History Of Philosophy” (1999), “Ambivalence Of Philosophy” (2011); “Metaphilosophy: Theory Of The Historico-Philosophical Process” (2009). A number of references due to the difficulty of reading the archived article text have been omitted or taken from new editions. The text has been prepared and edited by Ilya T. Kasavin. (shrink)

Truth is the adequate reflection of objective reality by an individual in the process of cognition, a reflection which reproduces the object being cognized as it exists outside of and independent of cognition; it is the objective content of human perceptions, concepts, sensations, judgments, deductions, theories, as verified by societal experience. Truth is the infinite associated sequence and continuity of the results of acquiring knowledge, the increasingly all-sided and profound reflection of interacting, changing, contradictory objects. This historical concept of truth (...) is the foundation of the dialectical materialist distinction between relative and absolute truth. Also associated with this is the Marxist understanding of cognition as the dialectical movement from relative to absolute truth. The problem of truth is one of the principal problems of dialectical logic. Truth must not be identified with logical truth in the sense of an epistemo-logical description of an adequate relation between the objective content of knowledge and objective reality, or as the concept of the formal conditions for the expression of truth. (shrink)

In their work The German Ideology the founders of Marxism assert that the prerequisite of post-capitalist (defined by them as communist) society is the universal development of human abilities and all social relations. But then on the same page, contrary to this statement, it is alleged that the abolition of private property is not only highly topical but it is also an imperative history-making task. In Manifesto of the Communist Party Marx and Engels explain that economic crises recurrently shaking the (...) capitalist society expose an apparent contradiction between the productive forces and the capitalist relations of production - therefore, these relations must be eliminated for the preservation of society. Nonetheless, the same treatise affirms that the bourgeoisie cannot exist without revolutionizing not only the productive forces but also the relations of production. But in this case it stands to reason to recognize that there is no conflict between the productive forces and the production relations, and, therefore, there is no crisis of the capitalist system, either. Paradoxes in the communist theory of Marxism stem not merely from erroneous conceptions but reveal the fact that Marxism as an ideology comes into conflict with its scientific social theory. Hence, these paradoxes disclose relative independence of the social theory of Marxism from its ideological postulates. (shrink)

In their work The German Ideology the founders of Marxism assert that the prerequisite of post-capitalist (defined by them as communist) society is the universal development of human abilities and all social relations. But then on the same page, contrary to this statement, it is alleged that the abolition of private property is not only highly topical but it is also an imperative history-making task. In Manifesto of the Communist Party Marx and Engels explain that economic crises recurrently shaking the (...) capitalist society expose an apparent contradiction between the productive forces and the capitalist relations of production - therefore, these relations must be eliminated for the preservation of society. Nonetheless, the same treatise affirms that the bourgeoisie cannot exist without revolutionizing not only the productive forces but also the relations of production. But in this case it stands to reason to recognize that there is no conflict between the productive forces and the production relations, and, therefore, there is no crisis of the capitalist system, either. Paradoxes in the communist theory of Marxism stem not merely from erroneous conceptions but reveal the fact that Marxism as an ideology comes into conflict with its scientific social theory. Hence, these paradoxes disclose relative independence of the social theory of Marxism from its ideological postulates. (shrink)

The antithesis of nature and freedom is the central idea of Kant's philosophy. It is the direct expression of its postulated division of all existing things into the world of phenomena, which in their sum-total constitute nature, and its original foundation—the world of things in themselves, which lie beyond the categorial determinations of nature. Necessity and causal relations, like space and time, apply only to the world of phenomena; the world of things in themselves is free of these determinations and, (...) therefore, constitutes the realm of freedom—freedom from the intractable laws of nature. Thus, Kant, on the one hand, proves the unconditional subsumption of phenomena under the laws of nature, under the strictest determinism, and, on the other, insists just as decisively that freedom is the first, pretemporal link in the cause-and-effect chain of events. True, the existence of this original freedom is unprovable; it is unknowable, supersensible, and transcendent. But if we agree that there are not only phenomena but also things in themselves, then the conclusion about freedom is fully justified. If, on the other hand, we reject the existence of things in themselves, then we deny at the same time any possibility of freedom, for there are no exceptions in natural determinism. (shrink)

The concept of truth is a fundamental category in the theory of knowledge and philosophy in general. Other philosophical categories presuppose the concept of truth as their content or as the goal of investigatory inquiry. Philosophy begins historically with rejection of any form of opinion in the name of truth and with the counterposing of what truly exists to the variety of appearance. Thus was born theoretical thought, for which in antiquity philosophy was a synonym.

This article offers an analysis of dialectical materialism. The author, being a supporter of this theory, offers a self-critical assessment of its foundations. He argues that the predecessors of Marxism constructed their systems with the confidence that they were building the true and only true philosophy. This utopian idea shared by Marx, Engels, and their successors was refuted by subsequent developments in philosophy. Indeed, philosophy by its very nature is pluralistic and interminable. Self-critical Marxism must recognize the legitimacy not only (...) of dialectical materialism, but also of other philosophies no matter how much they may differ in their content. This is supported by analysis of the main categories and problems of dialectical materialism—the laws of dialectics, matter, evolution, consciousness, and truth. (shrink)

I am perfectly aware that to both the writing and the reading public, a theoretical discussion today of the basic problems of Marxism seems superfluous or at best inappropriate. However, I cannot share this dominant sentiment.

The author considers the claim about the existence of a unified subject matter of philosophy in the light of the existence of a diversity of philosophies. It is shown that a unified subject matter of philosophical inquiry for all historical periods is unfounded, and that Marxist attempts to give a universal definition of the subject matter of philosophy is inadequate. The author defends the position of a qualitative change in the subject matter of philosophy in the course of its development. (...) The article provides an overview of major philosophical themes through the prism of the subject-object relationship. The themes under discussion include: nature, the human agent, personality, individuality, subjectivity, and the topic of a cognitive and active relationship between the human and the world. The article shows that the unity of the subject matter of philosophy can be defined only in the most general terms, since the above main themes are only partially and idiosyncratically reflected in different philosophies. (shrink)

The question of the relation of Marxism to utopianism is first of all the question of its relation to Utopian socialism and communism. However, the concepts of Utopia and utopianism are much broader than the substance of the particular socialist and communist teachings that preceded Marxism or existed alongside it. For precisely this reason the concept of Utopia must first of all be examined separately from Marxism. Only such an approach can reveal the real content and, in a sense, the (...) enduring significance of the Utopian element in people's consciousness, thinking, and worldview. (shrink)

The scientific-philosophical world-view of Marxism is a negation of philosophy in the old, traditional meaning of that word. That is, Marxism represents a negation of any attempt to create a completed system of philosophical knowledge that would exhaust the object of its research and be independent of all the subsequent development of cognition and of the life of society. This negation is concrete, dialectical, and materialist, and constitutes a significant factor in the philosophical revolution wrought by Marx and Engels in (...) creating the philosophical system called dialectical and historical materialism, differing fundamentally from all prior philosophical systems. (shrink)

The history of philosophical thought has often been compared to a comedy of errors, and is one of the most important dimensions of the intellectual history of mankind. Quests for a correct view of the world and tragic mistakes, the polarization of philosophy into mutually exclusive trends, which is sometimes thought of as a permanent scandal in philosophy — these are not merely the searchings and sufferings of individual thinkers. This is the intellectual odyssey of mankind, and those to whom (...) it appears a farce apparently interpret the tragic only as the idols of the theater. But the fact is that antinomies, crises, retracing of steps, the discarding of real truths in favor of erroneous concepts long since refuted but stubbornly taken as true — are these things characteristic of philosophy alone? Philosophy is the intellectual image of mankind, and the contradictions of its development are of no small importance to the intellectual biography of humanity. (shrink)

The subjectivist-agnostic interpretation of the category of truth, which we examined in Part One, on "critical rationalism," has deep epistemological roots. Hence, Lenin's analysis of the epistemological intentions of "physical" idealism, which emerged at the end of the last century, is fully applicable to a description of the epistemological falsification of Karl Popper and his followers.

The author examines the philosophical doctrines of Kant and Hegel, and puts forward a thesis concerning the inner ambivalence of these doctrines. The thesis is supported with concrete examples demonstrating the internal contradictions in the philosophical systems of Kant and Hegel. The more a philosophical doctrine is meaningful and innovative, the more it is contradictory, ambivalent, and aporiastic, in spite of the efforts of its founder and followers to reconcile all of its major claims. This ambivalence, however, turns out to (...) be a positive quality, because it allows philosophers to transcend their philosophical system, and if not directly, then indirectly raises the questions: Should philosophers continue building systems? And do not all self-contained systems fetter philosophical discourse? (shrink)

The author recollects the significant landmarks in the institute's development, which coincides with and reflects the history of the country over the past eighty years.

In The Manifesto of the Communist Party the founders of Marxism demarcated in a principled way the qualitatively different forms of Utopian socialism. They critically analyzed "feudal socialism," petty-bourgeois socialist Utopias, bourgeois pseudo-socialism and, finally, the critical-Utopian socialism of St. Simon, Fourier, and Owen, which was one of the theoretical sources of the scientific ideology of the working class. This analysis shows that as early as the first half of the nineteeth century ideologies that were foreign to the working class (...) frequently appeared under the banner of socialism. In some cases this socialism had an imaginary, purely phraseological character. In others, it represented a petty bourgeois interpretation of the proletarian liberation movement. But critical-utopian socialism was the reflection of "the first instinctive yearnings of the proletariat for a universal reconstruction of society." This class characterization of the various modifications of socialist doctrine during the epoch of the West European bourgeois democratic revolutions has great methodological significance for understanding the whole subsequent evolution of the ideology of capitalism. (shrink)

If you are looking for a clear, concrete overview on social constructionist research and analysis, look no further than Constructing the Social. This timely volume pools the talents of many leading psychologists and sociologists, who in each case ground theory into practical examples. Contributors demonstrate that human beings are principally social agents rather than passive reactors that process information. Each contributor analyzes the historical and cultural contexts implicit in a wide range of key issues including anxiety, the family, intelligence, aging, (...) and depression. Constructing the Social is an invaluable resource for psychologists, sociologists, and other researchers across the social sciences who seek to understand the implications of social constructionist theory. (shrink)

Calls to hold artificial intelligence to account are intensifying. Activists and researchers alike warn of an “accountability gap” or even a “crisis of accountability” in AI. Meanwhile, several prominent scholars maintain that accountability holds the key to governing AI. But usage of the term varies widely in discussions of AI ethics and governance. This chapter begins by disambiguating some different senses and dimensions of accountability, distinguishing it from neighboring concepts, and identifying sources of confusion. It proceeds to explore the idea (...) that AI operates within an accountability gap arising from technical features of AI as well as the social context in which it is deployed. The chapter also evaluates various proposals for closing this gap. I conclude that the role of accountability in AI ethics and governance is vital but also more limited than some suggest. Accountability’s primary job description is to verify compliance with substantive normative principles—once those principles are settled. Theories of accountability cannot ultimately tell us what substantive standards to account for, especially when norms are contested or still emerging. Nonetheless, formal mechanisms of accountability provide a way of diagnosing and discouraging egregious wrongdoing even in the absence of normative agreement. Providing accounts can also be an important first step toward the development of more comprehensive regulatory standards for AI. (shrink)

Persistence through time is like extension through space. A road has spatial parts in the subregions of the region of space it occupies; likewise, an object that exists in time has temporal parts in the various subregions of the total region of time it occupies. This view — known variously as four dimensionalism, the doctrine of temporal parts, and the theory that objects “perdure” — is opposed to “three dimensionalism”, the doctrine that things “endure”, or are “wholly present”.1 I will (...) attempt to resolve this dispute in favor of four dimensionalism by means of a novel argument based on considerations of vagueness. But before argument in this area can be productive, I believe we must become much clearer than is customary about exactly what the dispute is, for the usual ways of formulating the dispute are flawed, especially where three dimensionalism is concerned. (shrink)

Allow me to preface my remarks today by saying that I am not going to give a lecture in the usual sense of communicating results or presenting a systematic statement. Rather, what I have to say will remain on the level of an essay; it is no more than an attempt to take up and further develop the problems of the so-called Frankfurt discussion. I recognize that many uncomplimentary things have been said about this discussion, but I am equally aware (...) that it approaches the problem correctly and that it would be wrong always to begin again at the beginning. (shrink)

Traditional debate on the metaphysics of gender has been a contrast of essentialist and social-constructionist positions. The standard reaction to this opposition is that neither position alone has the theoretical resources required to satisfy an equitable politics. This has caused a number of theorists to suggest ways in which gender is unified on the basis of social rather than biological characteristics but is “real” or “objective” nonetheless – a position I term social objectivism. This essay begins by making explicit the (...) motivations for, and central assumptions of, social objectivism. I then propose that gender is better understood as a real kind with a historical essence, analogous to the biologist’s claim that species are historical entities. I argue that this proposal achieves a better solution to the problems that motivate social objectivism. Moreover, the account is consistent with a post-positivist understanding of the classificatory practices employed within the natural and social sciences. (shrink)

There will be a few themes. One to get us going: expansion versus contraction. About an object, o, and the region, R, of space(time) in which o is exactly located,1 we may ask: i) must there exist expansions of o: objects in filled superregions2 of R? ii) must there exist contractions of o: objects in filled subregions of..

This is a German translation with commentary of Aristotle’s Prior Analytics, Book I. The introduction (‚Einleitung‘, pp. 97–182) contains a concise history of the reception of Aristotle’s syllogistic from Theophrastus to Kant and Hegel. The commentary places special attention to the modal chapters (i. e. I 3 and 8–22). Aristotle’s modal syllogistic is treated with more sympathy than in other modern commentaries and discussions of this part of Aristotle’s logic.

Some philosophers believe that everyday objects are 4-dimensional spacetime worms, that a person (for example) persists through time by having temporal parts, or stages, at each moment of her existence. None of these stages is identical to the person herself; rather, she is the aggregate of all her temporal parts.1 Others accept “three dimensionalism”, rejecting stages in favor of the notion that persons “endure”, or are “wholly present” throughout their lives.2 I aim to defend an apparently radical third view: not (...) only do I accept person stages; I claim that we are stages.3 Likewise for other objects of our everyday ontology: statues are statue-stages, coins are coin-stages, etc. At one level, I accept the ontology of the worm view. I believe in spacetime worms, since I believe in temporal parts and aggregates of things I believe in. I.. (shrink)

In this article, I explore the value of philosophy of science for history of science. I start by introducing a distinction between two ways of integrating history and philosophy of science: historical philosophy of science and philosophical history of science. I then offer a critical discussion of Imre Lakatos’s project to bring philosophy of science to bear on historical interpretation. I point out certain flaws in Lakatos’s project, which I consider indicative of what went wrong with PHS in the past. (...) Finally, I put forward my own attempt to bring out the historiographical potential of philosophy of science. Starting from Norwood Russell Hanson’s insight that historical studies of science involve metascientific concepts, I argue that philosophical reflection on those concepts can be historiographically fruitful. I focus on four issues and discuss their significance and utility for historiographical practice. (shrink)

For deliberations on the ethical and meta-ethical implications of Alfred North Whitehead's process philosophy, here are abstracts and papers from the Ethics Section of the 6th International Whitehead Conference held at the University of Salzburg in Salzburg, Austria in July 2006. In accordance with the conference schedule, there are three subsections. The subsection on "Metaphysics of Morals and Moral Theory" includes contributions from Franklin I. Gamwell (Does Morality Presuppose God?), John W. Lango (abstract only), Duane Voskuil ("Ethics' Dipolar Necessities and (...) Theistic Implications), and Theodore Walker Jr. ("Neoclassical Cosmology and Matthew 22:36-40). The subsection on "Evaluating Moral Practices" includes contributions from Frederick Ferrè (abstract only), Seung Gap Lee (Hope for the Earth: A Process Eschatological Eco-ethics for South Korea), Mary Elizabeth Mullino Moore (Compassion, Creativity, and Form: The Ethics of Institutions), and George W. Shields (Ruse, Altruism, and Process Philosophy). The subsection on "Ethics and Aesthetic Values" includes contributions from Stephen T. Franklin (abstract only), Brian G. Henning (Is There an Ethics of Creativity?), Mihàly Tòth (Art of Life and the Ethics of Life Forming), and Guorong Yang (Problems and Perspectives in the Emerging of Global Society). (shrink)

I try to show that Aristotle does not restrict 'praxis' to those activities which have their end in themselves. NE VI 5, 1140b6-7 need not to be taken as an argument in favour of the restricted interpretation: the wording of the passage is compatible with the interpretation that the end of a praxis is (another) praxis (e.g. eupraxia), the end of a poiesis on the other hand is never a poiesis. This interpretation fits better the use of 'praxis' throughout the (...) NE. MM A 34, 1197a4-12 is discarded since the MM is not written by Aristotle. Next I discuss the relation between the verbs 'prattein' and 'poiein' on the one hand and the corresponding nouns 'poiesis' and 'praxis' on the other, in order to determine their exact meaning. To conclude, Aristotle's distinctions are compared to certain tenets of H. Arendt in her 'Vita Activa'. (shrink)

One often hears a complaint about “bare particulars”. This complaint has bugged me for years. I know it bugs others too, but no one seems to have vented in print, so that is what I propose to do. (I hope also to say a few constructive things along the way.) The complaint is aimed at the substratum theory, which says that particulars are, in a certain sense, separate from their universals. If universals and particulars are separate, connected to each other (...) only by a relation of instantiation, then, it is said, the nature of these particulars becomes mysterious. In themselves, they do not have any properties at all. They are nothing but a pincushion into which universals may be poked. They are Locke’s “I know not what” (1689, II, xxiii, §2); they are Plato’s receptacles (Timaeus 48c–53c); they are “bare particulars”.1 Against substratum theory there is the bundle theory, according to which particulars are just bundles of universals. The substratum and bundle theories agree on much. They agree that both universals and particulars exist. And they agree that a particular in some sense has universals. (I use phrases like ‘particular P has universal U ’ and ‘particular P ’s universals’ neutrally as between the substratum and bundle theories.) But the bundle theory says that a particular is exhaustively composed of (i.e., is a mereological fusion of) its universals. The substratum theory, on the other hand, denies this. Take a particular, and mereologically subtract away its universals. Is anything left? According to the bundle theory, no. But according to the substratum theory, something is indeed left. Call this remaining something a thin particular. The thin particular does not contain the universals as parts; it instantiates them. (shrink)

Logic for Philosophy is an introduction to logic for students of contemporary philosophy. It is suitable both for advanced undergraduates and for beginning graduate students in philosophy. It covers (i) basic approaches to logic, including proof theory and especially model theory, (ii) extensions of standard logic that are important in philosophy, and (iii) some elementary philosophy of logic. It emphasizes breadth rather than depth. For example, it discusses modal logic and counterfactuals, but does not prove the central metalogical results for (...) predicate logic (completeness, undecidability, etc.) Its goal is to introduce students to the logic they need to know in order to read contemporary philosophical work. It is very user-friendly for students without an extensive background in mathematics. In short, this book gives you the understanding of logic that you need to do philosophy. (shrink)